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Zhang Haoli 
Abstract
This paper examines whether stock return is related to the extent of portfolio 
concentration on the part of institutional fund managers. There is evidence that large 
firms are preferred for both concentrated and well-diversified funds. Also, a trading 
strategy based on concentrated ownership generates positive abnormal return. This 
implies that informational effect (implied in an increase in concentrated capital) has 
significant impacts and predictability on returns. Meanwhile, we do not find 
diversified ownership has predictability on future stock returns. 
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11. Introduction
For decades, the truth about diversification has exerted a significant influence on 
the way investors managed their portfolios as well as finance researchers thought 
about portfolio theories and applications. Even among novices, the idea of not putting 
all eggs in one basket has caused far-reaching societal and cultural responses toward 
their finances, which manifest themselves in the form of value investing and index 
fund products. Conventional wisdom, which needs no complex mathematical 
discourse, suggests that investors should widely diversify their holdings across stocks 
and industries to reduce their portfolios’ idiosyncratic risk.
But what exactly comes with diversifying behavior? Do we diversify because we 
don’t know, or do we decide not to diversify because we know? Diversification, 
despite its desirable characteristics of safeguarding an investor’s asset, is at its core no 
more than a hedge against ignorance. If an investor “knows” Apple stock is going to 
blow on the upside tomorrow as soon as market opens, would he or she prefer to have 
a sizable bet (i.e. bet of a lifetime) on the stock, or would he or she remain 
methodically ‘sound’, emotionally inert, and invest only up to an amount emitted out 
of its portfolio optimization algorithm?
The answer is not clear, nor do we attempt to showcase our success in predicting 
abnormal return by tracking the number of outrageous gamblers toward various stock 
positions. All we refer to is that diversification does have something to do with a lack 
of “special” information. In the extreme sense, it is time to throw away your computer 
2if you know exactly what is going to occur to a stock or a basket of stocks.
The above implies that when we see more “concentrated” positions toward a stock 
that should imply its favorable return in the future periods, because “concentrated” 
implies “know”. Fund managers, however, might want to hold concentrated portfolios 
if they believe some industries will outperform the overall market or if they have 
superior information to select profitable stocks in specific industries [Kacperczyk, 
Sialm, Zheng (2005)].
Levy and Livingston (1995) show in a mean-variance framework that managers 
with superior information should hold a relatively concentrated portfolio. Van 
Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2005) argue that optimal under-diversification arises 
because of increasing returns to scale in learning. Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik 
(2004) find that smaller funds tend to outperform larger funds due to diseconomies of 
scale. While the size of the fund negatively affects its performance, it is possible that a 
wide dispersion of holdings across many industries also may erode its performance.
Mutual fund managers may also hold concentrated portfolios due to a potential
conflict of interest between fund managers and investors. Several studies indicate that 
investors reward stellar performance with disproportionately high money inflows but 
do not penalize poor performance equivalently. (Numerous studies have called 
attention to the performance-flow relation, for example, Ippolito(1992), Brown, 
Harlow, and Starks (1996), Gruber (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Goetzmann 
and Peles (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), and Nanda, 
Wang, and Zheng (2004).) This behavior results in a convex option-like payoff profile 
3for mutual funds. Consequently, some managers, especially those with lower 
investment abilities, may have an incentive to adopt volatile investment strategies to 
increase their chances of having extreme performance.
Kacperczyk, Sialm, Zheng (2005) argue that mutual fund managers may decide to 
deviate from a well-diversified portfolio and concentrate their holdings in industries 
where they have informational advantages. Their results indicate that, on average, 
more concentrated funds perform better after controlling for risk and style differences 
using various performance measures. They also find that the superior performance of 
concentrated mutual funds is primarily due to their stock selection ability.
Furthermore, they find that concentrated funds are able to select better stocks even 
after controlling for the average industry performance. They also show that the return 
difference between the buys and the sells by mutual funds increases significantly with 
industry concentration. This finding indicates that concentrated mutual funds are more 
successful in selecting securities than diversified funds. 
All these findings indicate that the choice between diversify and concentrate may 
contain some information which would reflect the expectations of investors and thus 
affect the returns of the stocks. Since the amount of wealth managed by institutional 
investors has grown considerably and mutual funds can represent the institutional 
investors, it is reasonable to investigate the preference of mutual funds and thus check 
the characteristics of stocks hold by institutions with different diversification level. 
However, the opposite can be said with comparable analytical strengths. We could 
envision a case where having larger and “diversified” investors going into a stock 
4could make stock gain publicity, investor assurance, and thus help boost its future 
returns. It is because large and “diversified” funds carry themselves as being prudent, 
and that spells much wanted sentiments especially in an unsettling market with 
extreme volatility. When reputable and usually well-diversified funds such as 
Vanguard and Fidelity increase their stakes in a few stocks, does the funds’ positive 
image and publicity get transmitted into bullish sentiments toward the stocks as well? 
Related studies show the positive impact of index inclusion has on stock returns (e.g. 
Jain (1987)). We believe the similar reasoning, along the line of positive sentiments,
is applied when stocks are considered desirable simply because large and reputable 
funds increase their stakes in those stocks. Coincidentally, those large and reputable 
funds are usually well-diversified compared to other funds.
Two opposing effects are therefore at work. Besides having “concentrated implying 
knows”, we also expect stocks largely held by diversified funds have good 
performance because of the some signal effect. The informational effect of 
undiversified bets might either be more or less intense than the signal effect of 
apparently un-informational positioning done by large players. The net effect is at this 
point unknown, and will be our principle task to address in this paper.
Prior literature suggests that institutional investors may over-diversify since many 
funds hold more than 100 stocks. Statman (1987) shows a well-diversified portfolio of 
randomly chosen stocks must include at least 30 stocks for a borrowing investor and 
40 stocks for a lending investor. We could suspect that some institutional investors 
may over-diversify their portfolios. Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) provides rational 
5and irrational justifications for limited diversification. Transaction costs and taxes 
restrict the portfolio holdings of investors. Private information is another motive for 
holding large and undiversified positions. Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2005) 
argue that optimal under-diversification arises because of increasing returns to scale in 
learning. Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) find that smaller funds tend to 
outperform larger funds due to diseconomies of scale. While the size of the fund 
negatively affects its performance, it is possible that a wide dispersion of holdings 
across many industries also may erode its performance.
These findings give us the impression that concentrated portfolio is a prelude to 
superior performance. Some investors might hold over-diversified portfolios 
compared with the diversified ones. Some investors might hold under-diversified
portfolios because of the transaction costs or inside information. The pertinent issue is 
whether a change in capital commitment toward a stock by undiversified investors 
says anything about its future returns. Due to the two opposing effects as mentioned 
above, there is no straightforward answer to this query other than to give the problem 
its structure which we could test against with data.
Gompers and Metrick (2001) show that large institutions, as compared with other 
investors, prefer to invest in large, liquid stocks that have low past returns. They also 
find that the level of institutional ownership in a stock can help to forecast its future 
return. Their analysis supports the importance of investor clienteles for understanding 
asset pricing. Their conclusions also support the plausible, but un-informational, 
impact of increased stock holdings by large institutional funds.
6Goetzmann and Kumar (GK 2003) find that systematic under-diversification of 
individual investors influence asset prices and their diversification factor has 
incremental explanatory power over the standard risk factors for small stocks, value 
stocks and growth stocks. In addition, they also predict that the examinations for 
combined diversification levels of individual and institutional investors will be more 
accurate to analyze the pricing impact of idiosyncratic risk. In our paper, we adopt 
GK’s diversification measures in extracting the fund’s parameters for our tests.
For a diversified owner, a stock’s short term price fluctuation is less likely to induce 
him to liquidate his position on the stock (since his overall portfolio is well 
diversified). In other words, he would have higher tolerance for short-term 
performance of each individual stock, compared with an undiversified owner of the 
same stock. 
Our present goal is to first go into the mutual fund’s holding data and determine 
their levels of diversification. We then aggregate this fund-level characteristic 
information for each stock that the funds own. This aggregation allows us to form 
stock-level measure that indicates the extent of concentrated vs. diversified 
ownerships. Using standard tests, we then explore whether this measure has a 
directional linkage with expected stock returns. The relationship, when observed, 
would help us whether the informational effect of undiversified holding, or the 
opposing, signal effect of diversified holding, dominates at the margin.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first introduce the data and 
methodology this paper uses. This section includes some summary statistics about the 
7sample data. Then we test if the portfolios formed on our concentrated investment 
measures yield abnormal return. We will then analyze the results, perform various 
robustness tests, and specify the further researches to be done. Finally, we will 
conclude the results obtained thus far with an emphasis on promising insights we 
could stimulate on this subject.
82. Data and Methodology
The data we used in this paper is obtained from Thomson Reuters (s12) database as 
well as the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Our dataset covers 4470 
funds whose stock holdings were recorded in the Thomson database from March 1980 
to December 2005. To study if portfolio concentration has an independent impact on 
stock returns, we include only funds are not considered index funds. In the Thomson 
Reuters data, we have singled out funds that describe themselves as aggressive growth, 
growth, growth & income, or balanced (i.e. they have an investment objective code 
(ioc) of 2, 3, 4, and 7, respectively). 
For the ease of exposition, let us first define a few variables that are useful for our 
analysis.
Let Iq,t be the collection of stocks owned by institution q by the end of month t, Xi,
q,t be the dollar amount of stock I, owned by institution q, by the end of month t.  
Having these variables defined, let’s define wi,q,t as institution q’s portfolio weight on 
stock i by the end of month t. By definition, 
   
After we obtained the basic data, we computed the fund-wise diversification measures 
which would then be aggregated at the stock levels. 
(1).Fund level diversification measures
Goetzmann and Kumar (GK, 2003) discuss three diversification measures, each of 
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9which has different emphases and characteristics. For intuitive and illustrative 
purposes, I have chosen to adopt one of the measures, as follows:
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Where Nm is the number of stocks in the market at a given time (i.e. end of month 
t) and wm is the average market weight of a stock, based on Nm. Alternatively, we 
have adopted a value-based approach in computing wm, and it made no significant 
deviation to our main results.  There are, however, various ways we could compute 
fund J’s wj,t. We could compute this weight based on the fund’s reported NAV at the 
end of month t, or we could compute it based on the total value of its stock holdings 
derived from the database directly. The following measures describe these alternative 
measures.
w: the weight of a stock in fund’s portfolio, based on the total value of a 
fund’s stock holdings;
We, then, define the following diversification measures for each interval in the sample 
period.
Div = sum of w’s squared.
Stkcount = the number of stocks being held by the fund.
Intuitively, the higher a Div variable is, the more concentrated, or undiversified, a 
fund’s portfolio is. Div also falls between 0 and 1 by definition, making comparisons 
and further aggregations convenient. We expect the deviation from average 
diversification level of the group could be a more effective measure to form 
stock-level characteristics, especially when we examine the sub samples. Therefore, 
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we define the deviation from the average Div as follows:
, , ,( )q t q t q tAbdiv Div Avg Div 
Here, Divq,t is the Div measure of fund q at time t while Avg (Divq,t) is the average of 
Divq,t of the sample. The larger Abdivq, t is, the more diversified the fund is. 
(2). Aggregation of Div to form Stock-Level Characteristics 
After computing Abdivq, t is for each fund q, and we know the {Xi,q,t} and {wi,q,t}
series for each stock I, being held by fund q at the end of time t, we need to devise a 
way to gauge the level of concentrated investment toward a certain stock i. 
The following is a list of stock-level variables we formed based on an aggregation 
of fund-level diversification measures.
(i) NDivWgti,t = sum of Xi,q,t over all fund q’s whose Abdivq, t is among 
the highest 10% for all funds at the end of time t.
(ii) DivWgti,t = sum of Xi,q,t over all fund q’s whose Abdivq, t is among the 
lowest 10% for all funds at the end of time t .
   NDivWgti,t and DivWgti,t are stock i’s attributes that reflect the capital invested by 
its under-diversified, and well-diversified, institutions, respectively. The top and
bottom 10% are arbitrarily specified for illustrating our hypothesized relationship 
between concentrated positions and stock returns.
Portfolios could be generated to test if a concentration-return relationship exists. 
For instance, let’s form a portfolio, called Ndiv, which include all stocks that 
registered a non-zero Ndivwgt value (i.e. because by definition, not all stocks would 
have a positive value of Ndivwgt). Ndiv is therefore a portfolio of stocks that have 
11
implied the presence of concentrated capital committed to its value appreciation. The 
Ndiv portfolio is equally weighted portfolio including all stocks with a non-zero 
Ndivwgt value.
The same could be done to generate Div portfolio using the stocks’ Divwgt weights. 
Our thesis is now reduced to a testable hypothesis of whether Ndiv, Div, or a mixture 
of them, performed differently relative to a random portfolio of stocks. 
Should we expect the Ndiv portfolio to command a higher return than a random 
portfolio? If it did, concentrated investment carried informational value that was 
generally not priced in during our sample period. Alternatively, Div portfolio might do 
better than Ndiv if positive sentiments arisen from an injection of large and 
well-diversified capital dominates unusual information toward stocks. Our paper 
presents an opportunity to test if one of the effects is more important than the other.
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3. Statistical summary
(1). Fund level statistical summary 
Table 1 shows us the summary statistics of the diversification measures for fund 
level. As we can see that the average number of stocks increases with the portfolio 
size. This means that when an institution is larger, it tends to hold more stocks. We 
also find that sum_w_sq decreases with the portfolio size. For Div (sum_w_sq), the 
mean decreases from 0.0217 to 0.0133 as portfolio size increases from small to large. 
This implies that the larger the institutions, the more diversified the institution is.
Because the lower the diversification measures, the more diversified the fund is. In 
addition, we find the variance of number of stocks increases with fund size. 
Goetzmann and Kumar (2003) find that during the 1991-96 sample periods, the 
average number of stocks in individual investor portfolios increases from 4 to 7. We
also examine the time-variation in the average diversification level of portfolios of 
institutional investors. We divide the entire sample period into five sub periods and 
see how the diversification level varies as time changes. 
(2). Sub periods statistical summary
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of diversification measures for different sub 
periods. It is very obvious that institutions tend to hold more stocks and there is a 
monotonic increase in number of stocks over time. The mean of sum_w_sq decreases 
over the time which implies that there is an improvement of diversification level from 
1980 to 2005. Since sum_w_sq is a more effective proxy of the diversification level 
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and the decrease of this proxy is the largest in the small fund sample, small funds have 
the largest improvement of diversification level over time.  
(2). Stock level statistical summary
Table 3 shows us the summary statistics of the diversified/undiversified ownership 
measure at the stock level. There are at least three observations worth mentioning. 
First, return increases with Mkt-Cap for data of the both panels except for the largest 
quintile. This implies that large firms tend to gain higher return than small firms. This 
phenomenon is consistent with the disappearance of the small-stock premium in 
recent years. Small-stock premium was first pointed out by Banz (1981) and then 
analyzed in subsequent studies. However, this premium has reversed since 1980.The 
summary statistics of our sample data seems to support this. 
Second, in panel A, Ndivwgt increases with Mkt-Cap, which implies that the larger 
the firm is, the more likely that it will be largely held by under-diversified institutions. 
We know that under-diversified institutions face a higher idiosyncratic risk and tend to 
require a higher return. Recall that large stocks earn a significant premium over small 
stocks since 1980(Gompers and Metrick (2001)).It is reasonable that under-diversified 
institutions are infatuated with large stocks. 
In panel B, Divwgt also increases with Mkt-Cap, which implies that 
well-diversified institutions tend to hold large stocks. This phenomenon is consistent 
with the finding of Gompers and Metrick (2001) and a related study by Falkenstein 
(1996). They find that the one hundred largest institutions increased their share of the 
market from 19.0 percent in 1980 to 37.1 percent in 1996. Also, they argue that large 
14
institutions prefer large, liquid stocks. Recall that we find that larger institutions tend 
to be more diversified in the fund level analysis. 
Together with the two facts, it is understandable that there is a positive relation 
between Divwgt and Mkt-Cap. Finally, we also find from table 4 that the mean of 
excess return for firms with NDivwgt is slightly larger than that for firms with Divwgt.
This suggests that the informational effect might be sufficiently large to offset the 
signal effect from diversified capital, and thus dominates in terms of return 
predictability for stocks over our testing period. 
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4. Multi-factor model estimation
(1). Empirical results of Ndiv/ Div portfolios
After we generated the Ndiv and Div portfolios based on the Ndivwgt and 
Divwgt variable, we check whether one or both of these two portfolios generated 
abnormal return from an asset pricing perspective. We used the Fama-French (1992) 
specification to provide our primary benchmark.
1 2 3p fR r mktrf smb hml  D E E E  H
Table 5 reports the main results of the regression. It seems that both Ndiv and Div 
portfolio generate statistically significant return at the 1% level. It is intuitive, as 
NDiv is correlated with favorable but unpriced information, while Div being related to 
sentiments (or herding-related feedback trading) induced from large institutional 
participants. It is therefore natural to expect both NDiv and Div are predictive of 
future returns as a result. Now what remains to be explored is which effect is 
marginally stronger. Table 5 shows the abnormal return of Ndiv portfolio is larger 
than that of Div portfolio. This indicates the informational effect is larger than signal 
effect. The coefficient of market premium is larger for Ndiv portfolio. This implies 
the Ndiv portfolio has higher system risk. 
Gompers and Metrick (2001), in a related work, find that the level of institutional 
ownership in a stock has predictive power to forecast its future return, and this power 
comes from the demand shocks resulting from the compositional shift in ownership 
toward institutions. From this point of view, stocks which are largely hold by 
well-diversified institutions may convey a positive signal since investors might 
believe the judgments of powerful institutions. Therefore, a stock with high Divwgt 
might generate high demand for this stock and thus boost future return.  
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However, Gompers and Metrick (2001) also find that large institutions, as 
compared with other investors, prefer to invest in large, liquid stocks that have low 
past returns. From this perspective, we might say that a stock with high Divwgt tends 
to be large, liquid one and thus with low return. If we define the points from the two 
different angles as two different effects of Divwgt variable, does the total result imply 
that the demand effect is stronger than the preference effect? Thus far, these issues 
remain a puzzle to us and we will come back to this point in the next draft. 
Table 6 reports the regression results of different fund size samples. We find Div 
portfolio get larger abnormal return for the large fund sample. While for medium and 
small fund sample, Ndiv portfolio generates larger abnormal return.  
(2). Robustness test 
As a cross check, table 7 reports the mean of the prices of stocks included in the 
two portfolios for several arbitrage chosen time point. We observe from table 7 that 
almost for all periods, the mean of stock price is larger, three months after the 
respective portfolio formation dates. Assume the portfolio is generated at time t and 
then we can compare the stock prices of three months later with the stock prices of 
time t. In figure 2 and figure 3 we find that actually prices of most stocks will increase. 
Three monthly time-periods are arbitrarily chosen in the sample period for Ndiv and 
Div portfolio respectively (December 1992, March 1999, March 2005). To make the 
price difference more visible, we use the logarithmic scale of the real figure. 
Therefore, data points above 1 means the price difference are positive while the data 
points below 1 means the price difference are negative. We find that prices of most 
stocks in the portfolio increased after three months. This also verifies that the 
diversification measure can be used as a portfolio formation tool.
(3). Overlapping between Ndiv and Div portfolios
17
Although both the Ndiv and Div portfolios can generate positive abnormal return, 
we found that some stocks held by under-diversified funds are also held by 
well-diversified funds. And the number of such stocks is not small. Table 8 shows us 
the number of stocks for each portfolios and the total number of tradable stocks as of 
the end of each year in our sample. We observed that Ndiv portfolio and Div portfolio 
have a fair number of stocks in common. This could point to the fact that
well-diversified funds and under-diversified funds hold the same stocks for different 
reasons.  A ready explanation that justifies the overlap would be that well-diversified 
funds sometimes also adjust their stock holdings based on informational reasons (i.e. 
not just the undiversified funds possess special information). If that is true, both 
undiversified and diversified funds increase their holdings toward a stock because of 
special information. Diversified funds might need to observe guidelines in terms of 
their exposure on a single stock, while undiversified funds are not constrained by this 
stringent requirement. This will be a plausible argument for the observed overlap, and 
await further research for confirmations. We find the correlation of returns of Ndiv 
portfolio and Div portfolio is very large and the large fund sample has the largest 
correlation. The Seemly unrelated regression of the two portfolios indicates there is no 
significant difference between abnormal returns of two portfolios. 
Although the empirical result shows that both the Ndivwgt and Divwgt portfolios 
can earn abnormal return, the mechanism of the profit generation probably is different 
for the two portfolios. Since the overlapped stocks are held by both well-diversified 
investors and under-diversified investors, we expect that stocks with more dollar 
value held by under-diversified investors tend to command a higher return. To test this 
hypothesis, we generate a special parameter and call it z variable for the moment. We 
18
define the z variable as follows
Z= Ndivwgt / (Ndivwgt+Divwgt)
For all the overlapped stocks in the two portfolios, we calculate the z variable. 
The higher the z variable, the larger percentage the stock is held by the 
under-diversified investors. Therefore, we expect that a trading scheme that longs the 
stocks within the top 5% of all z variables while shorts the stocks within the bottom 5% 
of all z variables can be a profitable strategy. We use the z variable as the portfolio 
weight to verify the presence of abnormal return. We find that this trading strategy 
earned 0.7% return for the three months holding period. Although the magnitude is 
not very large, it demonstrates that this z variable might provide a promising angle to 
exploit our main results in this paper. 
19
5. Test of Concentrated/Diversified Ownership
To better understand whether concentrated/diversified ownership has some 
predictability of future stock returns, we analyzed a long-short strategy based on 
ranking of concentrated/diversified ownership. We define concentrated/ diversified 
ownership as follows:
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   Here, Concentrated Ownership of stock i at time t is the percentage of capital 
committed by concentrated funds. Diversified Ownership of stock i at time t is the 
percentage of capital committed by diversified funds. We construct two portfolios 
based on ranking of ,i tCO and ,i tDO respectively. We long stocks with top 10% 
,i tCO while short stocks with bottom 10% ,i tCO within the concentrated funds 
holding universe. For diversified funds holding universe, we long stocks with top 10% 
,i tDO while short stocks with bottom 10% ,i tDO .
  Table 9 reports the regression results based on the trading strategy mentioned above. 
We find the concentrated ownership has some predictability about future stock returns 
and the trading strategy based on ,i tCO generate significant positive (0.46% per 
month) abnormal return. While the strategy based on ,i tDO is unable to get 
significant abnormal return. The higher percentage of capital committed from 
concentrated funds, the better performance the stock will get in the future. While 
20
diversified capital percentage does not have significant relationship with the future 
stock return. This is also consistent with the result that informational effect is larger. 
Because we find percentage of capital committed from concentrated funds has better 
predictability of future stock returns.  
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6. Test of An Alternative Strategy
(1). Test of Delta-Y strategy 
In most of our earlier tests, we look at only the most diversified funds and most 
concentrated funds. This might leave out important observations. It is thus instructive 
to devise a way to examine other diversified-undiversified deciles. 
A potentially fruitful measure is one that registers an increase / decrease of capital 
going into a certain decile. For example, let us define variable Y as
Y=m / # of funds in the decile
Change in Yi,t= , , , 3i t i t i tY Y Y '  
1    
Here m refers to the sum dollar value held by different diversified level funds 
respectively for each stock. Because the change of Y (Delta-Y) reflects the average 
cash inflow or outflow from the respective diversification level funds, it might contain 
more information. Therefore, the testing hypothesis is a trading strategy that long the 
top Delta-Y stocks while short the bottom Delta-Y stocks will get abnormal return. 
We construct two portfolios based on the ranking of Delta-Y of stocks and use the 
Market capitalization as the portfolio weight. The long portfolio concludes stocks 
with the top 10% large Delta-Y whiles the short portfolio concludes stocks with the 
bottom 10% Delta-Y. Table 10 shows us the abnormal returns of this Delta-Y trading 
strategy for various holding periods. 
The comparison among different holding periods indicates that in the short run (e.g. 
3months/6 months), the cash inflows (positive Delta-Y) from several most diversified 
deciles can get better positive market reaction and the specified Delta-Y trading 
                                                       
1 Here, i refers to stock i while ,i tY refers to the Y of stock i at the time of t.    
22
strategy can obtain more abnormal returns in these deciles. However, for the longer 
holding period (e.g. 9 months/1 year), the cash inflows (positive Delta-Y) from the 
relative concentrated deciles tend to reflect more positive information and the 
specified Delta-Y trading strategy can obtain more abnormal returns in these deciles. 
That means investors can implement this Delta-Y strategy in different diversification 
level funds according to the expected holding period. If investors need a short term 
investment, they can use the Delta-Y trading strategy within more diversified deciles. 
Firstly, they should rank funds based on diversification level. Then, they should 
implement the Delta-Y strategy in the more diversified deciles. In contrast, if 
investors need a relatively long term investment, they should implement the Delta-Y 
strategy in the concentrated deciles. As long as investors implement this Delta-Y 
strategy flexibly, they can always earn abnormal returns. 
(2). Sub periods results of Delta-Y strategy
  To analyze whether this result holds for the sub periods, we also divide the entire 
sample into sub period samples. Recall we use the quarterly data to run the regression, 
it is inherently impossible to have too many sub periods due to few observation 
problem. Therefore, we just divide the whole sample period into two sub periods. 
Table 11 shows us the abnormal returns gained by the Delta-Y trading strategy for the 
3 months holding period for the two sub periods. Since the longer holding period 
results for sub periods analyses are exhibit the same conclusion, we do not show the 
longer holding period results here. 
For the three month holding period, we can still find the sub period results are 
consistent with the previous results. For both most diversified decile and most 
concentrated decile, the abnormal return from Delta-Y trading strategy is larger at the 
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more recent period (1993-2005). It indicates that the Delta-Y trading strategy is more 
useful for the more recent period. Therefore, it could be useful to implement the 
Delta-Y trading strategy in the recent portfolio management. 
(3). Results based on different fund size or stock size samples
Some people may argue that the results may be largely driven by the fund sizes or 
stock sizes. It is necessary to check whether the fund sizes or stock sizes lead to the 
results. Firstly, we divide the entire sample into three sub samples based on the size of 
funds. We use the rank of assets as the proxy for the size of funds. Then we implement 
the Delta-Y trading strategy in the large fund, medium fund and small fund sub 
samples respectively. Secondly, we divide the entire sample into three sub samples 
based on the size of stocks. We use the rank of market capitalization as the proxy for 
the size of stocks. Also we use the Delta-Y trading strategy in the large stock, medium 
stock and small stock sub samples respectively. 
From table 12, we may conclude that the overall result for the more diversified 
deciles may be driven by the large funds while the overall result for the more 
concentrated deciles may be driven by the small funds. This is reasonable because 
large funds tend to hold more diversified portfolios while small funds tend to hold 
more concentrated portfolios.  This fact can be verified by the correlation between 
the size rank and the div rank. Recall the larger the size rank, the larger the fund is 
while the higher the div rank, the more concentrated the fund is. The general negative 
correlation coefficient between these two ranks (-0.22425) indicates that large funds 
tend to be more diversified while small funds tend to be more concentrated. Figure 1 
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shows the correlation coefficient between size rank and diversification rank of funds. 
The correlation coefficient is negative for the entire sample period. Figure 1 also 
shows the trend that the phenomenon described above is not so significant in the 
recent period as before. The absolute value of the negative correlation coefficient 
decreases in the more recent period. 
Table 13 shows the abnormal return gained by Delta-Y trading strategy for 3 
months holding period for the different stock size samples. We can clearly find from 
table 11 that in the small stocks universe, investors view the cash inflow from the 
more diversified funds contains more positive information. The magnitude of the 
abnormal return for more diversified deciles is much larger than that for more 
concentrated deciles. When we compare horizontal numbers in the most diversified 
decile, the result of the whole sample is more similar with that of large stocks 
universe. Thus for most diversified deciles, the overall result is more likely driven by 
large stocks. However, for most concentrated deciles, the overall result is more likely 
driven by small stocks. When we compare the most diversified deciles and the most 
undiversified deciles, it is obvious that the Delta-Y strategy performs better for the 
most diversified funds in the three months holding period analysis. 
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7. Conclusion
In this paper, we take a look at how funds’ diversification profiles affect stock 
returns. We expect that how much return a risk-taker requires depends on his 
diversification profile. The study uses quarterly data from 1980 to 2005 drawn from 
SDC and monthly return data from CRSP. We find that there is a positive relation 
between the level of diversification and the size of the fund. Also, we find there is an 
obvious improvement of general diversification level over time. The summary 
statistics of stock level data seem to be consistent with the disappearance of 
small-stock premium in recent years. In addition, both under-diversified institutions 
and well-diversified institutions tend to hold large stocks.
For the multi-factor model test, the abnormal return of both Ndiv and Div portfolio 
are significantly positive and expected. This shows that both increases in concentrated 
capital and diversified capital predict positive abnormal returns. The reasons were 
extensively hypothesized in the introduction section. Briefly put, an increase in 
undiversified position points to an informational reason, while that in diversified 
position points toward a positive-sentiment argument. Both effects are important. 
However, the tests, especially those toward the end of our analysis, showed that the 
former effect tends to dominate the former,
We also find that there are many overlapped stocks in Ndiv and Div portfolios. 
That means these stocks are held both by well-diversified funds and under-diversified 
funds. We also suspect that well-diversified funds and under-diversified funds hold 
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these two stocks based on different motivations. In addition, the robustness test shows 
us that the mean of the prices will increase in the next three months for stocks that are 
included in either the Ndiv portfolio or Div portfolio. Therefore, the two portfolios 
can obtain positive abnormal return is obviously possible. We also find the 
concentrated ownership has some predictability of the future stock returns while the 
diversified ownership has no significant predictability of future stock performance. 
Concentrated ownership matters while diversified ownership does not matter within 
the concentrated or diversified fund holding universe.
   The analysis of our change-in-Y (Delta-Y) strategy indicates that the average net 
cash flow of more diversified funds contains more positive information than that of 
more undiversified funds. However, for a longer holding period, the average net cash 
flow of more undiversified funds tend to deliver more positive information. 
Based on our analysis in this paper, we confirm the importance of the extent of 
concentration in institutional portfolios in stock returns, and will resolve any 
outstanding issues in our future research on this topic.
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Appendices:
Table 1
Summary Statistics for Different Fund Sizes (Fund Level)
This table reports the statistics of the diversification measures of portfolios for different fund sizes. We 
use the holding assets at the end of each quarter as the proxy for fund size. The sample period is from 
March 1980 to December 2005.All the data are obtained from 13F and SDC quarterly data for mutual 
fund. Variable Stkcount refers to number of stocks held by funds while sum_w_sq (Div) is sum of w 
squared.
Fund level summary statistics
                 mean median minimum maximum std dev
Full Sample
Stkcount 455.2 151 1 3735 708.89
Sum_w_sq 0.0163 0.0122 0.0007 1 0.0237
Large Fund Sample
Stkcount 615 233 0 3735 867.52
sum_w_sq 0.0133 0.0107 0.0007 1 0.0162
Medium Fund Sample
Stkcount 394 137 0 3621 600.22
sum_w_sq 0.0178 0.0127 0.0006 1 0.0288
Small Fund Sample
Stkcount 257 88 0 2864 452.34
sum_w_sq 0.0217 0.0170 0.0008 1 0.0312
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Table 2
Summary Statistics for Different Sub Periods (Fund Level)
This table reports the summary statistics for fund level for different sub periods. The sample period is 
from March 1980 to December 2005.All the data are obtained from 13F and SDC quarterly data for 
mutual fund. Variable sum_w1_sq (Div1) is sum of w1 squared while w1 is defined as value of a 
stock’s position/ total value the fund’s stock holdings. We divide the whole sample period into five sub
periods, which are 1980-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000, and 2001-2005.
Sub periods
1980-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005
Panel A: Mean
Full Sample
Stkcount 111.7 218.2 370.7 484.6 546.3
Sum_w1_sq 0.0257 0.021 0.0158 0.0154 0.0154
Large
Stkcount 169.7 375.7 437.9 637.8 796.1
Sum_w1_sq 0.0199 0.0153 0.0133 0.0134 0.0119
Medium
Stkcount 107.5 154.1 421.9 451.2 415
Sum_w1_sq 0.0239 0.0215 0.0158 0.0159 0.0189
Small
Stkcount 54.5 113.5 186.8 265.5 343.8
sum_w1_sq 0.0345 0.0273 0.0235 0.0211 0.0185
Panel B: Median
Full Sample
Stkcount 68 82 135 171 211
Sum_w1_sq 0.022 0.018 0.0126 0.0119 0.0105
Large
Stkcount 89 142 190 269 400
Sum_w1_sq 0.0189 0.0137 0.011 0.011 0.0094
Medium
Stkcount 75 81 138 150 172
Sum_w1_sq 0.02 0.0184 0.0119 0.0121 0.0116
Small
Stkcount 44 53 78 95 111
Sum_w1_sq 0.0297 0.0249 0.0183 0.0162 0.0142
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Table 3
Summary Statistics for Different Mkt-Cap Firms (Stock Level)
This table reports the statistics of the Ndivwgt and Divwgt for different Mkt-Cap firms. The sample 
period is from March 1980 to December 2005.All the data are obtained from SDC quarterly data for 
mutual fund. The Return is the monthly return data from CRSP. The Ndivwgt will be assigned to the 
next two months for each quarter end month data. This is to make sure that the Ndivwgt/ Divwgt reflect 
the most recently reported situation. Panel A shows the summary statistics for the Ndivwgt variable 
while panel B shows the summary statistics for the Divwgt variable.
Mkt-Cap Quintiles
Panel A:NDivWgt Statistics
All Small Q2 Q3 Q4 Large
Mean
Return 0.0135 0.0088 0.0134 0.0152 0.0156 0.0146
NDivWgt 74,476,008 1,375,703 4,012,906 10,446,936 31,360,924 325,383,064
Median
Return 0.0075 0 0.0054 0.0096 0.0109 0.0121
NDivWgt 4,138,625 521,076 1,639,700 4,152,932 12,362,625 80,041,734
Panel B:DivWgt Statistics
Mean
Return 0.0132 0.0092 0.0123 0.0148 0.0155 0.0148
DivWgt 6,987,228 476,239 1,540,415 4,298,801 10,047,470 18,577,828
Median
Return 0.0044 0 0 0.0071 0.0101 0.0119
DivWgt 1,599,213 215,888 816,000 2,078,384 4,873,660 7,315,342
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Table 4
Summary Statistics for Excess Returns of Different Portfolios
Table4 reports the summary statistics of the excess return for the Ndiv portfolio and Div portfolio 
respectively. Summary statistics include N (number of observations), the mean, median, variance, 
skewness and kurtosis of the excess return over risk free rate for the two portfolios.
Summary statistics for excess return
N Mean Median Variance Skewness Kurtosis
Ndiv portfolio 310 0.0094 0.014 0.0031 -0.81 2.997
Div portfolio 310 0.0092 0.014 0.003 -0.66 3.42
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Table 5
Abnormal Return of Div/Ndiv portfolios
This table shows us the main results of the regression for the Ndiv and Div portfolio respectively. The 
sample period is from March 1980 to December 2005. The standard risk factors are obtained from the 
CRSP. Here, we use monthly portfolio return minus the risk free return as dependent variable. The 
mktrf refers to the market premium. Each of the numbers reported is the coefficient of the regression. 
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. I indicate two-side statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% as ***, 
** and * respectively.
Regression result for the Div portfolio and Ndiv portfolio
Variable Div portfolio Ndiv portfolio
Intercept 0.00323 0.00397
(2.63)*** (3.32)***
Mktrf 1.02823 1.09981
(34.72)*** (37.09)***
SMB 0.59222 0.54597
(15.51)*** (14.28)***
HML 0.16392 0.14806
(3.57)*** (3.22)***
Adjusted R-sq 0.9506 0.9455
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Table 6
Monthly Abnormal Return of Ndiv/Div Portfolio for Different Fund Size Sample
This table shows us results of the regression for the Ndiv and Div portfolio for different fund size 
respectively. The sample period is from March 1980 to December 2005. The standard risk factors are 
obtained from the CRSP. Here, we use monthly portfolio return minus the risk free return as dependent 
variable. The mktrf refers to the market premium. Each of the numbers reported is the coefficient of the 
regression. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. I indicate two-side statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 
10% as ***, ** and * respectively.
Large Large Medium Medium Small Small
Ndiv Div Ndiv Div Ndiv Div
intercept 0.00272 0.00397 0.00494 0.00396 0.00399 0.00329
(2.34)** (3.05)*** (3.99)*** (3.12)*** (3.01)*** (3.02)***
mktrf 1.11632 0.99867 1.10814 1.04069 1.09356 1.04007
(38.35)*** (30.71)*** (35.77)*** (32.71)*** (32.92)*** (38.12)***
SMB 0.44778 0.56233 0.44321 0.53036 0.45575 0.53858
(12.36)*** (13.89)*** (11.5)*** (13.39)*** (11.02)*** (15.86)***
HML 0.16087 0.13891 0.15147 0.1716 0.15554 0.1439
(3.52)*** (2.72)*** (3.12)*** (3.44)*** (2.99)*** (3.36)***
UMD -0.0997 -0.19931 -0.09779 -0.16594 -0.1097 -0.13403
(-3.51)*** (-6.29)*** (-3.24)*** (-5.35)*** (-3.39)*** (-5.04)***
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Table 7
Robustness Test-Price Changes for Ndiv/Div Portfolios
Table6 reports the mean of the prices of stocks included in the two portfolios. Price (t) refers to the 
current stock price while the Price (t+3) refers to the stock price three months later.
Robustness test
Panel A. NDiv portfolio
1988-09 1992-12 1999-03 2005-03 2005-06
Price(t) 21.38 28.46 27.12 27.87 29.66
Price(t+3) 21.82 29.02 28.8 28.08 31.12
Panel B. Div portfolio
Price (t) 18.05 20.13 20.83 21.38 23.62
Price(t+3) 17.82 20.47 23.05 21.82 24.31
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Table 8
Number of Stocks of Each Portfolio and exchangeable stocks
This table shows the number of stocks for each portfolios and the total number of exchangeable stocks 
for each year during the entire sample (1980-2005).
Year #Stocks that have 
Ndivwgt
#Stocks that have Divwgt #Stocks that can be traded
1980 1513 1486 5507
1981 1566 1695 5846
1982 1478 1801 6070
1983 1712 2422 6732
1984 1836 2835 6972
1985 1928 3107 7093
1986 2347 3370 7531
1987 2669 3888 7810
1988 2536 4052 7849
1989 2588 3926 7567
1990 2667 3744 7377
1991 2863 3847 7447
1992 3090 4073 7743
1993 4419 4936 8301
1994 5302 5488 8830
1995 5887 5742 9226
1996 6472 6456 9816
1997 7053 6605 10048
1998 6867 6792 9900
1999 6450 6537 9582
2000 6254 6711 9293
2001 5146 6191 8569
2002 4866 6020 7886
2003 4801 5255 7456
2004 4991 5376 7309
2005 5052 5275 7325
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Table 9
Results of Long-Short Strategy within Ndiv/Div Portfolio
This table shows us results of the regression for the Long-Short Strategy based on the concentrated
ownership and diversified ownership for different fund size sample respectively. The sample period is 
from March 1980 to December 2005. The standard risk factors are obtained from the CRSP. Here, we
use monthly Long-Short portfolio return minus the risk free return as dependent variable. The mktrf 
refers to the market premium. Each of the numbers reported is the coefficient of the regression. Figures 
in parentheses are t-statistics. I indicate two-side statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% as ***, ** and 
* respectively.
Entire Sample Large Fund Sample Medium Fund Sample   Small Fund Sample
Ndiv Div Ndiv Div Ndiv Div Ndiv Div
Intercept 0.00461 -0.002 0.00478 -0.00299 0.0032 -0.00309 0.00548 -0.00444
(2.65)*** (-0.68) (2.45)** (-1.55) (1.12) (-1.87) (2.87)*** (-1.35)
Mktrf 0.20107 0.06455 0.18431 -0.04116 0.08019 0.04088 0.07281 0.05506
(3.19)*** (0.9) (3.1)*** (-0.47) (1.25) (0.64) (1.08) (0.7)
SMB 0.06612 0.23264 0.14904 0.04014 -0.15634 0.27568 -0.00885 0.22391
(0.81) (2.52)*** (1.51) (0.35) (-1.89) (3.36)*** (-0.1) (2.19)**
HML 0.24969 0.15246 0.18443 0.20088 0.02177 0.16248 0.09407 0.16457
(2.55)*** (1.37) (1.55) (1.47) (0.22) (1.65)* (0.9) (1.34)
UMD -0.08193 -0.11096 -0.10184 -0.13294 -0.10403 -0.02119 -0.17195 -0.10967
(-1.31) (-1.57) (-1.35) (-1.52) (-1.64)* (-0.34) (-2.58)*** (-1.4)
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Table 10
Abnormal Return of Delta-Y trading strategy 
This table shows us the abnormal returns gained by the Delta-Y trading strategy for different holding 
periods. The diversification level indicates the rank of sum_w1_sq of funds. The most diversified 
deciles refer to the bottom rank funds while the most undiversified deciles refer to the top rank funds. 3 
months, 6 months, 9 months and 1 year in the table refer to the holding period for the strategy. Figures 
in parentheses are t-statistics. I indicate two-side statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% as ***, ** and 
* respectively.
Results of Delta-Y trading strategy
Abnormal return (intercept)
Diversification level 3 months 6 months 9 months 1 year
Most diversified
0.0239 0.0087 0.0133 0.01275
(3.13)*** (0.76) (2.77)*** (1.58)
2nd deciles
0.02 0.0129 0.0149 0.01143
(1.76)* (0.99) (2.06)** (1.05)
3rd deciles
0.0304 0.0071 0.0186 0.0004
(2.38)** (1.28) (2.25)*** (0.08)
4th deciles
0.0280 0.0167 0.0189 0.0052
(1.75)* (1.61) (1.99)** (0.76)
5th deciles
0.0023 0.0121 0.0132 0.0064
(0.39) (1.12) (2.64)*** (0.83)
6th deciles
0.0039 0.0222 0.0203 0.0078
(0.44) (1.71) (2.23)** (0.86)
7th deciles
0.0094 0.0037 0.0202 0.0123
(0.85) (0.62) (2.44)** (2.81)***
8th deciles
0.0135 0.0056 0.0225 0.0160
(1.01) (0.85) (2.2)** (2.33)**
9th deciles
0.0047 0.0127 0.0067 0.0296
(0.57) (1.48) (1.41) (3.77)***
Most concentrated
0.0242 0.0149 0.0151 0.0308
(0.42) (1.51) (1.59) (2.79)***
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Table 11
Abnormal Return of Delta-Y Trading Strategy for Sub Periods
This table shows the abnormal returns gained by the Delta-Y trading strategy for the 3 months holding 
period. The diversification level indicates the rank of sum_w1_sq of funds. The most diversified 
deciles refer to the bottom rank funds while the most undiversified deciles refer to the top rank funds. 
The two sub periods of the sample are from 1980-1992 and 1993-2005. The division of the sub periods 
is a subjective decision. Since it is impossible to divide into more sub periods, I just divide the whole 
sample period into two sub periods. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. I indicate two-side statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, 10% as ***, ** and * respectively.
Sub-period analysis /3 months holding(exclude outliners) 
Diversified level 1980-1992 1993-2005
Abnormal return R-sq Abnormal return R-sq
Most diversified
0.0189 0.1922 0.02835 0.1322
(1.97)** (3.82)***
2nd deciles 0.0064 0.0282 0.0221 0.1955
0.94 1.52
3rd deciles 0.0215 0.1631 0.0371 0.0686
1.71 (3.56)***
4th deciles 0.00813 0.062 0.02945 0.1154
1.42 (3.45)***
5th deciles 0.0036 0.0732 -0.0037 0.0766
0.83 (-0.5)
6th deciles 0.0023 0.0854 0.0045 0.0385
(0.27) (1.15)
7th deciles 0.00814 0.0319 0.0103 0.1315
(0.72) (0.97)
8th deciles 0.0062 0.0255 0.0139 0.1265
(0.94) (2.11)**
9th deciles -0.0006 0.0675 0.0075 0.1172
(-0.11) (1.49)
Most undiversified 0.0129 0.0045 0.0257 0.1532
(0.37) (0.68)
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Table 12
Abnormal Return of Delta-Y Trading Strategy for Different Fund Size 
Universe  
This table shows the abnormal returns gained by the Delta-Y trading strategy for the 3 months holding 
period. The entire sample was divided into three sub samples- large funds, medium funds and small 
funds. The diversification level indicates the rank of sum_w1_sq of funds. The most diversified deciles
refer to the bottom rank funds while the most undiversified deciles refer to the top rank funds. Figures 
in parentheses are t-statistics. I indicate two-side statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% as ***, ** and 
* respectively.
3 months holding period 
Diversified level Large funds Medium  funds Small funds All funds
Most diversified 0.0247 0.0206 0.0152 0.0239
(4.18)*** (3.04)*** (2.72)*** (3.13)***
2nd deciles 0.0206 0.0095 0.0191 0.02
(1.79)* (1.13) (1.11) (1.76)*
3rd deciles 0.0321 0.0071 0.0063 0.0304
(3.09)*** (1.09) (0.9) (2.38)**
4th deciles 0.0276 0.0137 0.0158 0.0280
(1.73)* (1.43) (2.06)* (1.75)*
5th deciles -0.0025 0.0078 0.0031 0.0023
(-0.46) (0.45) (1.12) (0.39)
6th deciles 0.0042 0.0016 0.0028 0.0039
(0.66) (0.29) (0.42) (0.44)
7th deciles 0.0031 0.0096 0.0094 0.0094
(0.56) (1.68) (1.66) (0.85)
8th deciles 0.0106 0.0119 0.0158 0.0135
(0.89) (1.02) (1.25) (1.01)
9th deciles 0.0034 0.0045 0.0049 0.0047
(0.31) (0.56) (0.61) (0.57)
Most concentrated 0.0189 0.0177 0.0259 0.0242
(0.31) (0.29) (0.52) (0.42)
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Table 13
Abnormal Return of Delta-Y Trading Strategy for Different Stock Size 
Universe  
This table shows the abnormal returns gained by the Delta-Y trading strategy for the 3 months holding 
period. The entire sample was divided into three sub samples- large stocks, medium stocks and small 
stocks. The diversification level indicates the rank of sum_w1_sq of funds. The most diversified deciles
refer to the bottom rank funds while the most undiversified deciles refer to the top rank funds. Figures 
in parentheses are t-statistics. I indicate two-side statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% as ***, ** and 
* respectively.
3 months holding period
Diversified level Large stocks Medium stocks Small stocks All
Most diversified 0.0247 0.0176 0.0169 0.0239
(3.59)*** (1.99)** (1.78)* (3.13)***
2nd deciles 0.0216 0.0188 0.0126 0.02
(1.79)* (1.57)* (1.41) (1.76)*
3rd deciles 0.0306 0.0256 0.0211 0.0304
(2.41)** (1.99)** (1.59) (2.38)**
4th deciles 0.0284 0.0201 0.0194 0.0280
(1.81)** (1.61) (1.52) (1.75)*
5th deciles 0.0025 0.0021 0.0019 0.0023
(0.41) (0.37) (0.35) (0.39)
6th deciles 0.0027 0.0041 0.0038 0.0039
(0.33) (0.47) (0.43) (0.44)
7th deciles 0.0085 0.0086 0.0097 0.0094
(0.77) (0.78) (0.89) (0.85)
8th deciles 0.0116 0.0128 0.0142 0.0135
(0.91) (0.96) (1.12) (1.01)
9th deciles 0.0031 0.0044 0.0051 0.0047
(0.48) (0.52) (0.66) (0.57)
Most concentrated 0.0183 0.0207 0.0251 0.0242
(0.33) (0.38) (0.46) (0.42)
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Firgure 1. Correlation between Sizerank and Divrank. This figure shows the correlation coefficient 
between the size rank and diversification rank of funds during the entire sample period(March 1980 to 
Dec 2005). The size rank is based on the ranking of total net assets held by the funds, the 
diversification rank is based on the ranking of Div mentioned in section2.  
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Figure 2 Price difference for the stocks in the Ndiv portfolio. This figure shows the price changes in 
three months for the stocks in the Ndiv portfolio. Three monthly time-periods are arbitrarily chosen in 
the sample period(December 1992, March 1999, March 2005). To make the price difference more 
visible, I use the logarithmic scale of the real figure. Therefore, data points above 1 means the price 
difference are positive while the data points below 1 means the price difference are negative. 
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Figure 3 Price difference for the stocks in the Div portfolio. This figure shows the price changes in 
three months for the stocks in the Div portfolio. Three monthly time-periods are arbitrarily chosen in 
the sample period(December 1992, March 1999, March 2005). To make the price difference more 
visible, I use the logarithmic scale of the real figure. Therefore, data points above 1 means the price 
difference are positive while the data points below 1 means the price difference are negative. 
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